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ABSTRACT 
This paper attempts to assess to what extent growth of the manufacturing 
sector in Kenya has contributed to a process of integrated and wide 
spread economic development. 
There are three sections. The first reviews the general arguments of 
development theory to promote industrial development in the Third World 
countries. 
The second section deals with the pros and cons of the 'import-sub-
stitution' policy, which was adopted to speed up growth of the manu-
facturing sector. The last section brings together relevant research 
findings concerning the effects of this policy on the structure of the 
manufacturing sector, employment creation, income distribution and the 
operations of multi-national firms in Kenya. 
The conclusion is that the type of industrialization that occurred 
has not led to 'a structural transformation' of the Kenyan economy. 
Growth in the manufacturing sector, although fast in terms of output, 
has been growth within existing types of industries. Few 'forward-
and backward linkages' were developed and the impact of the policy 
on employment creation and income distribution can hardly be viewed 
favourably. Resources have been concentrated on a small part of the 
economy and to a large extent have neglected others, in particular 
agriculture. Multinational firms in Kenya have been a hindrance to 
the establishment of an integrated, balanced type of economic develop-
ment. Import-substitution did not lessen Kenya's external dependency, 
but merely changed its nature. Consequently, the policy was not 
effective in alleviating the balance of payments difficulties. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After World War II, when concern with the Third World countries 
became widespread, most development economists agreed that growth in 
aggregate output should be the prime economic objective for these 
countries. During the 1950's, there was a consensus that poor coun-
tries were caught in the so-called 'low level equilibrium trap' i.e. 
the tendency of population growth to outpace growth in production, 
keeping the per capita income level unchanged in the long run. In 
order to escape this trap and reach the point of 'take off into self-
sustained growth" (Rostow, 1953) various 'big spurt' theories were 
developed. These ranged from 'a critical minimum effort' (Leibenstein, 
1957) and a 'big push' (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1957) to 'balanced growth' 
(Nurkse, 1955) and 'unbalanced growth' (Hirschman, 1958) versions. 
It is not surprising that many of the lessons, taught by western de-
velopment economists were merely reflections of past development 
patterns in the now industrialized countries. Since rapid capital 
formation had played a crucial role there, it was assumed that the 
same would be true in the poor world and that capital accumulation 
could be realized in the industrial sector. 
Furthermore, because productivity of labour is high in industry 
and low in agriculture (Lewis, 1954), it was generally agreed that 
economic development i.e. growth of national output, required the 
transfer of labour from the primary to the secondary and later to 
the service sector. Agriculture would be freed of a huge labour sur-
plus, while more productive sectors of the economy would enable 
aggregate output to increase. 
Moreover industrialization would raise productivity in agri-
culture by increasing the demand for agricultural produce and making 
available tools and equipment needed to improve agricultural techniques. 
The spread effects induced by industrial expansion would affect other 
parts of the economy. New factories would not only need labour, but 
also machinery, raw materials, infrastructure, transport, communica-
tion, etc. Some of these requirements in turn would stimulate domestic 
production (although in the beginning many items would have to be pur-
chased abroad). Higher wages would increase demand for consumer goods 
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and further enhance domestic production. In short, what was supposed 
to get underway was the familiar multiplier-accelator mechanism, which 
would lead to cumulative expansion in all sectors of the economy. 
Industry was to fulfil the leading role. 
Of course development theorists were aware of the obstacles 
which would inhibit development along these lines in poor countries. 
There would be difficulties in the supply of technical, managerial 
and administrative manpower; bottlenecks in the availability of 
materials and equipment and inadequacies in the provision of transport, 
power and communication systems. But, through conscious planning these 
problems might eventually be solved. Moreover industrialization would 
take place with the help of foreign investments and considerable aid 
funds which would close the foreign exchange gap. 
There was also a more practical reason why industrialization was 
accorded such a high priority in development policies. The 'old colonial 
role' as exporters of primary commodities and providing a market for 
manufactured goods from the industrialized nations, proved to be de-
trimental to the poor countries. Export prices of primary commodities 
tended to fluctuate heavily and lagged behind prices of manufactured 
trade goods. There were also high protective tariffs against processed 
primary goods entering the rich countries. The combination of these 
factors called for the creation of an industrial base in the developing 
countries. 
Before turning to Kenya's industrial development, two more remarks 
should be made. First concern for unequal income distribution effects, 
as a result of the advocated industrial policy,was almost absent. It 
was simply 'theorized away' with the argument that uneven income distri-
bution was a sine qua non for capital formation and an inevitable out-
come of development in the early stages of growth. Moreover, Kuznets 
(1955) demonstrated that a process of more equal income distribution 
would set in, once per capita income had crossed a certain threshold. 
This 'trickle-down' effect which would lead to a widespread distri-
bution of the fruits of development, and introduce more and more people 
into productive employment, was generally accepted as the long run solu-
tion to short term regional and sectoral problems of inequalities. 
Secondly, as far as foreign investment and aid are concerned, 
little attention was paid to the inherent 'side effects' of massive 
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surplus transfers abroad and the intensification of Import dependence 
caused by the Implementation of modern (capital-intensive) production 
techniques, 
II. IMPORT-SUBSTITUTION 
In the 1950's and 60's many Third World countries attempted to 
create an industrial base through a policy of import-substitution, 
which meant that what had been formerly imported in consumer goods 
was produced locally instead. Arguments for this strategy Included; 
(1) The already established markets for the new industries;(2) Government 
protection of the 'infant' industries through bans on competitive 
imported goods and concessions on sales tax and customs duties o n 
inputs (3) A reduction in the relative importance of foreign trade 
thus reducing vulnerability to externally induced fluctuations, 
In many countries, including Kenya, this industrial strategy 
allowed for impressive growth of the industrial sector. However? as 
time went by, observers increasingly doubted the merits of this 
policy. Today it has become painfully clear that industrial growth 
alone is not able to alleviate the problems of mass poverty, income 
inequality, unemployment and regional imbalances, The disadvantages 
of import substitution can be summarized as follows5 
a) Much of past industrial investment should be labeled 'easy 
stage' investment, that is in manufacturing consumer goods and in in* 
frastructurai improvements, sectors where capacity could easily be 
expanded, But since, formerly imported, consumer goods are bought by 
only a smal1, h i g h - i n c o m e , fraction of the population, the internal 
markets for these products soon turn out to be too small to justify 
large-scale production, 
Hence further expansion in this direction is highly unlikely, 
Given the small size of the market, total demand can often be met by 
one or a few factories that enjoy heavy government protection against 
external competition. This leads to relatively high production costs, 
high prices and high monopolistic profits and contributes to a greater 
concentration of wealth, 
-4-
IDS/DP 276 
b) Given the nature of the product-mix (Western oriented type of 
products), these industries are mainly owned, financed and managed by 
foreign companies, reinforcing dependence on external capital, skills 
and technology. Moreover, because imported equipment was made arti-
ficially cheap (through low or non-existent import duties and an over-
valued exchange rate) it becomes attractive for companies to import 
their requirements rather than to obtain them from local suppliers. 
This not only aggravates the country's balance of payments, but also 
stimulates the use of capital-intensive techniques, which in turn has 
a detrimental effect on the amount or" labour used in the production 
process. Capital-intensive technologies are in general inconsistent 
with widespread unemployment and rapid population growth. 
c) A crital element in the 'chain reaction' set in motion by the 
import-substitution policy, is the weakness or even the absence of 
'forward and backward linkages' between domestic sectors. Growth in 
one sector, with limited spread effects to the rest of the economy, 
contributes little to the objective of engaging more people in pro-
ductive activities. Although it is true that the agricultural sector 
provides certain inputs for industry, the reverse supply linkages 
between industry and the agricultural sector have only developed to 
a limited extent. In fact, agriculture suffers from the policy of 
import substitution through an overvalued exchange rate, through 
monopoly pricing in the manufacturing sector and through surplus 
transfer to the manufacturing sector. 
The urban 'informal' sector is also bound to suffer since modern 
firms (multinationals) compete with craft domestic fabricates, dis-
placing artisans without offering sufficient new employment in the 
modern sector. 
Given these constraints and the failure to spread productive 
activities and raise welfare in all regions of the underdeveloped 
countries, and also, because past industrialization shows signs of 
having reached its limits of 'easy stage growth', another type of 
industrialization, export promotion is being advocated. Underdeveloped 
countries should now concentrate on the expansion of those industries 
able to compete in international markets. 
This implies that new demands of efficiency, quality and prices 
make themselves felt before successful access to the world markets 
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will be feasible. Not long ago such a strategy was successful in Japan 
and more recently in the so-called newly industrialized countries like 
Taiwan, South-Korea, Singapore, Mexico and Brazil. However, in the future 
it will be increasingly difficult for 'newcomers' to pursue such a po-
licy, not only because it demands a complete restructuring of the econo-
my and economic policies, but also because the rich countries, through 
tariffs, quota restrictions and other barriers, are inclined to pro-
tect their markets from exports of the Third World countries. 
In the present context of economic crisis and rising unemployment 
in the rich countries, the development of the poor world through export 
promotion seems to offer few possibilities. 
Given the inability of past industrialisation policies to bring 
about widespread development, 'new' suggestions have been put forward. 
Unified approach, integrated rural development, intermediate techno-
logy, informal sector and basic needs, and the New International Eco-
nomic Order are the latest slogans in the international forums of 
development experts. Agriculture or rather the rural sector has been 
'rediscovered
1
. All this simply reflects the growing awareness that 
past industrial strategies have failed to lead to increased welfare 
for the population as a whole. The debate has shifted from the merits 
of industrialization per se, to more practical (and policy) questions. 
How much industry, what type, with what techniques and for whom, em-
ploying what forms of organisation (private, foreign, statal or para-
n a t a l ). 
Having exploired some of the theoretical considerations involved 
in the industrialization issues, let us now turn to the case of Kenya. 
The main aim of the rest of the paper is to assess whether the indus-
trial base, that has been established in Kenya, represents a source 
of strength or a source of distortions for Kenya's economic and social 
development. 
The method applied is one of bringing together relevant findings 
of research on Kenya's industrial sector. Since these studies cover 
a wide range of interrelated topics, these findings are discussed 
under a number of headings relevant to the main question formulated 
above. The headings include: 
a) The Kenyan industrialization process 
b) Employment creation 
c) Income distribution 
d) Impact of multinational firm operations. 
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• RESEARCH FINDINGS ON KENYA'S INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
a
) The Kenyan Industrialization Process 
Kenya's industrial development after political independence in 
December 1963 cannot be understood without taking into account its 
colonial history. With the arrival of the white settlers, Kenyan 
agriculture underwent a far reaching transformation. The settlers, 
in collaboration with the British colonial government, occupied mil-
lions of acres of the best agricultural land (the so-called White 
Highlands), and confined the African population to the 'Native 
Reserves'. Shortage of land and the imposed exclusion of Africans 
from growing certain'
1
 export crops resulted in a large pool of cheap 
labour for the European estate farms. 
In 1912/13 African production accounted for at least 70 per 
cent of agricultural exports. By 1928 it had dropped to less than 
20 per cent and in later years it further declined as the 'reserves' 
increasingly relapsed into subsistence farming to support their in-
creasing populations. (C. Leys, 1975, p. 31). 
The Asians were brought into Kenya, first to help construct the 
Mombasa-Lake Victoria railway and later to provide skilled services 
to the white colonialists. The Europeans generated income for them-
selves, exports and foreign exchange for the country and tax revenu 
for the colonial government by producing tea, coffee, sisal, beef, 
maize, wheat and sheep. Part of this income was channelled to the 
Asian traders and craftsmen and a (small) part to the African agri-
cultural labourers, but most of the capital accumulated before 1945 
was invested in 'merchant' activities (wholesale/retail and import/ 
export firms) with only limited amount invested in agricultural pro-
cessing. The few manufacturing industries established up to World 
War II were mainly for some basic processing of agricultural exports 
and the processing of food for the local European and Asian market. 
From 1945 on, a small import-substituting industrial sector developed. 
This was financed by British and local Asian capital. 
One factor which induced British industry to enter direct manu-
facturing production in Kenya was the growing competition from non-
British suppliers which threatened Britain's share in the Kenyan 
^Africans were allowed to cultivate only such export crops that would 
completemerit but not compete with settler production. These products 
included: tobacco, wattle, cashew-nuts and Irish potatoes. (N. Swain-
son, 1978, p. 361) 
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market. Import-substition became an official government policy when 
protective tariffs were introduced in 1958 to enable local and foreign 
capital to increase industrial production behind comfortable tariff 
walls. From the development theory point of view this process was to con-
form to the objectives set for the early stages of development: laying 
the foundations of an industrial base, reducing the excessive depen-
dence on primary production and lessening import dependence in order 
to relieve the balance of payments. 
At independence Kenya's industrial (2) sector accounted for a relative-
ly small part of the total GDP. In 1956 this share was 15.8 per cent 
but it dropped to 13.0 per cent at independence in December 1963 
(Table 11. 
Table 1. Kenya's industrial sector, percentages of GDP, 1956 - 1964 
Year Mining and 
Quarrying 
Manufacturing Building and 
Construction 
Electricity 
and water 
Total 
19b6 0.7 9.4 4.8 0.9 15.8 
1957 0.6 9.6 4.7 1.0 15.9 
1958 0.6 9.9 4.0 1.1 15.6 
1959 0.5 9.4 3.7 1.2 14.8 
1960 0.5 9.6 3.5 1.2 14.8 
1961 0.4 10.1 3.5 1.3 15.3 
1962 0.3 9.4 2.8 1.4 13.9 
1963 0.3 9.4 1.9 1.4 13.0 
1964 0.3 10.2 1.6 1.2 13.3 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1966 and '69 
Most of this reduction was attributable to a decline in building 
and construction as independence approached. After independence the in-
dustrial share in GDP steadily rose to about 19 per cent in 1976 
(Development Plan 1979 - 1983, p. 84). 
"(2)The industrial sector is defined as including: mining and quarrying; 
manufacturing; building and construction; electricity and water. 
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As follows from Table 1, manufacturing is by far the most important 
industrial activity. Its share rose from 9.4 per cent of GDP in 1956 to 
10.2 per cent in 1964, and further increased to 14.3 per cent in 1976. 
In absolute terms manufacturing output grew fast at a yearly average of 
8 per cent between 1964 and 1972. 
At independence the structure of Kenya's manufacturing sector re-
flected the policy of import-substitution. It also reflected the 
colonial inheritance of a very uneven distribution of income. As the 
I.L.O. 1972 report puts it: 
The inequality iri incomes had led to a pattern of demand which 
in turn had established a structure of supply to meet it. The 
supply of goods from local production and from imports was 
sharply divided between suppliers to meet the high income luxury 
market and those for the low-income market, primarily basic goods 
for Africans and some Asians. (I.L.O. 1972, p. 86). 
Income data for enumerated employees reveal that in 1961 about 
22,000 Europeans (4 per cent of total employment) earned one third of 
the total wage bill set at £ K90 million in that year. Average European 
earnings was 18 times the average African earnings. By 1970 the reduced 
number of European employees (14,000) still accounted for 18 per cent 
of the total wage bill, while average income for this group was still 
12 times as high as the average income of the African employee. (Sta-
tistical Abstract, 1971, p. 187/196). 
The very limited participation of Africans in manufacturing is 
also illustrated by the division of nominal company capital among 
different groups. The total nominal company capital of firms re-
gistered between 1946 - 1963, was £ K139 million, of which 68 per 
cent was European, 21 per cent Asian, 11 per cent partly European 
and partly Asian and less than 1 per cent African (J. Kamau, 1965, 
p. 10). Thus from the outset, manufacturing was geared to satisfy 
the material demands of the European and Asian communities and was 
never directed towards the needs of the African majority. 
The main activities in the manufacturing sector were related 
to processing of primary products and last stage assembly production. 
Table 2 reveals that the so-called light consumer industries (3) 
"(3) We have somewhat" arbitranly divided the sector in three categories: 
1. light consumer industries including industries 1 - 7 ; 
2. intermediate industries including items 8 - 1 1 and 
3. capital goods industries, items 12 and 13. 
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account for 65.3 per cent of total manufacturing whereas 'intermediate 
industries' constitute 25.6 per cent and 'capital goods' only 9 per 
cent. Food processing, beverages and tobacco alone contributed no 
less than 45 per cent to the total. 
Table 2. Kenya's manufacturing sector at independence, 1963 
Industry Gross Production 
1. Food products 25,516 
2. Beverages and tobacco 8,016 
3. Textiles and clothing 3,769 
4. Footwear 1,792 
5. Wood and furniture 2,529 
6. Paper and printing 5,623 
7. Leather and rubber 1,096 
8. Clay and glass 763 
9. Basic chemicals and petroleum 10,570 
10, . Cement and other minerals 2,312 
11 . Metal products 5,276 
12 . Machinery and shipbuilding/repair 1,839 
13 . Railway rolling stock, motor vehicles 4,913 
14, . Miscellaneous 792 
Total 74,806 
d
Gross production is defined as the value of sales plus the net increase 
in stocks of work in progress and finished goods. 
Source: Statistical Abstract 1968, Table 88. Census of Industrial 
Production, 1963. 
It is important to note the high percentage of imported inputs, 
used in the manufacturing sector. In 1963, 42.5 per cent of all inputs 
used, came from abroad. This indicates that manufacturing as a whole 
used few local resources (apart from agriculture). In some industries 
almost all basic materials were imported: soft drinks (90 per cent); 
footwear (85 per cent); paints (90 per cent); soap (67 per cent), 
metal products (90 per cent); rubber products (95 per cent) indicating 
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the last stage processing or assembly character of many industries 
(Seidman, 1972, p. 24). 
From a development point of view two important conclusions could 
be drawn. First,, much of the value added in industries found its origin 
not in Kenya but in the foreign, inputs supplying countries and second, 
due to the high import content, few 'forward and backward linkages' 
were developed during the initial industrialization. 
How did the manufacturing sector develop after 1963? Table 3 shows 
the data for the year 1977. Although one should be cautious in comparing 
the Tables 2 and 3, because of changes in statistical coverage and re-
classification of industries during the 1963-1977 period, two conclusions 
can be drawn. 
Table 3. Kenya's Manufacturing sector, 1977 
Industry Gross Domestic Product
9 
Ki'OOO 
1. Food products 68,267 
2. Beverages and tobacco 25,000 
3. Textiles and clothing 16,009 
4. Leather and footwear 2,790 
5. Wood and furniture 8,980 
6. Paper and printing 17,757 
7. Basic chemicals and petroleum 8,723 
8. Rubber and plastics 10,020 
9. Pottery and glass 1,082 
10. Non metallic mineral products 9,307 
11. Metal products 20,363 
12. Machinery 9,461 
13. Transport equipment 11,424 
14. Miscellaneous 2,800 
Total 211,983 
a
Gross Domestic Product is defined as the aggregate difference between 
output and input. It includes labour costs, interest payment, depre-
ciation charges and net profit before tax. 
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1979, Table 125. Census of Industrial 
Production, 1977. 
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Despite the fact that some growth in the period under observation 
could be described as 'illusory', resulting from the wider coverage of 
firms in the latter Census of Production, it is apparent that the manu-
facturing sector experienced fast growth. However, when considering the 
structure of the sector, it is clear that no significant shift has oc-
curred from light consumer to intermediate and capital goods industries. 
The first category still accounted for 67.3 per cent of total manufac-
turing, intermediate industries for 23 per cent and the share of capital 
goods industries was 9.7 per cent. Food products and beverages and 
tobacco were still 43 per cent of the total. 
Consequently, import substitution policy, in itself very successful 
in terms of growth has not basically transformed the structure of the 
manufacturing sector. Thus the picture has been of more growth along 
existing lines, inste^ of 'structural change'. A similar conclusion is 
drawn by Hazlewood (1979, p. 65). 
As regards the 'foreign input' aspect of past growth;the role of 
foreign inputs, in terms of raw materials, intermediate goods, machinery 
and technology has increased. According to Jorgenson the past industria-
lization process was accompanied by increased imports of semi-processed 
raw materials, foreign machinery and technology, which more than offset 
the anticipated savings in imports of consumer goods. This leads him to 
conclude that "the Kenyan economy has become structurally more dependent 
since independence". (Jorgenson; 1975, p. 445). If this is true, then it 
is unlikely that the fast growth of Kenya's manufacturing sector also 
induced more use of local inputs and development of important forward-
and backward linkages in the economy. 
At this point, let us recall one of the disadvantages of import 
substitution policy set out earlier. It was argued that the policy could 
lead to an increase in the volume of imports since import substituting 
industries are to a great extent dependent on an inflow of intermediate 
products, machinery and spare parts. 
Data relating to Kenya's trade pattern in the 60's indicate that a 
shift in such a direction has indeed occurred. Total overseas imports 
rose sharply from K£ 76.5 million in 1964 to K£183,6 million in 1971. 
Capital goods, including transport equipment which accounted for 32 per 
cent of total overseas imports in 1964, rose to 39 per cent in 1971. Semi 
manufactured goods and metals (imports for manufacturing and building) 
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increased from 15.3 per cent (1964) to 19.1 per cent in 1971 (V.Vinnai; 
1973, p. 19). 
Thus, the policy of import-substitution coincided with a continued 
rise in imports not only in absolute terms but also as a proportion of 
GDP. It contributed to severe constrains in the balance of payments and 
by 1971 caused the government to decide to effect a number of import con-
trol measures. In 1972 the share of (intermediate and capital) imports 
which stood as high as 52.3 per cent of total manufacturing output in 
1971, decreased to 42.3 per cent, However, in 1974 increased again to 
46.4 per cent (Development Plan 1979/83, p. 330). Apparently instead 
of easing the balance of payments deficit in Kenya (and in many other 
Latin American and Asian countries), import-substitution actually con-
tributed to balance of payments difficulties. 
Power (1972) outlined the dangers of this policy and its inherent 
protection of consumer goods industries. An expansion of last stage 
production of consumer goods could continue until import substitution 
has largely absorbed the domestic market. When the limits of this 
market are approached, industrial growth is likely to stagnate unless 
investment moves to intermediate and capital goods industries and/or 
manufactured goods move into the export market. However, it is just 
these types of industries that are penalized by the same system of 
protection since effective rates of protection (i.e. rate of protection 
of value added) are highest for consumer goods, lower for intermediate 
goods, still lower for capital goods and lowest for exports. 
The required adjustment of the protection system, once domestic 
demand is fully met, will distress consumer good industries because 
it was this same protection system that allowed them to produce in-
efficiently and yet gain high profits at the same time. (4) 
Thus the contradictory situation arises that the government which 
imposes import restrictions (to offset balance of payments difficulties) 
also tends to curb manufacturing growth (of consumer goods) since these 
are heavily dependent on imports of equipment, spare oarts and materials. 
(4) For a theoretical framework of studying the effects of protection on 
the industrial sector see: M. Phelps & B. Wasow (1970). S. Lewis (1972) 
provided a study on the effects of protection on the balance of payments 
andlithe economy as a whole using an adapted "two-gap" Chenery and 
Strout macro-model. K. Kim (1973) provided an estimate of import sub-
stitution effects on domestic employment and foreign exchange savings 
using Kenya's 1967 input-output tables. 
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We have seen that in the second half of the seventies, Kenya's 
manufacturing sector continued to grow fast. However, it is also 
clear that there is 'little room' for further expansion of consumer 
goods industries. By 1977 imports of consumer goods had fallen to a 
mere 14 per cent of total imports while in 1964 they accounted for 
almost 30 per cent (Development I'lan 1979 - 1983, p. 7). Consequently 
a move towards exporting industries is required but will be much more 
difficult if the theory described above, works. 
Apart from the unfavorable effects on the balance of payments 
and the lack of a structural change within the manufacturing sector, 
import substitution had other negative effects. The Kenyan government 
is fully aware of these and has enumerated some of the negative effects 
of the policy in the 1974 - 78 Development Plan. These include: a 
sharp socio-economic cleavage, in which wages in the manufacturing 
sector increased to many times the average earnings of the workers in 
rural areas.due to the following reasons: 
i. Since machinery could be imported almost free of duty, manufacturing 
firms used it in preference to labour. Therefore, manufacturing became 
so capital-intensive that opportunities for employment were seriously 
1imi ted. 
ii. Because modern, capital-intensive manufacturing is most cheaply 
done by large companies, in many lines of activity one company was able 
to out-compete the rest and establish a monopoly. 
iii. Partly because of monopolies and partly because of tariff pro-
tection, the companies were able to charge high prices and earn high 
profits, thus contributing to a greater concentration of wealth. They 
were able to drive handicraft competitors out of existence, thus pro-
moting greater poverty for all the rest, and sharper social distinct-
ions than before. (Development Plan, 1974 - 78 p. 27). 
The plan also acknowledges: 'that a further distortion was the dis-
couragement of producers of capital and semi-finished goods. Thus the 
manufacturing sector lacked depth. Only finished goods were produced and 
production was geared to foreign suppliers of machinery and raw materials' 
(p. 27). 
In addition the plan states, rather optimistically: By contrast 
Kenya now hopes to develop an integrated manufacturing industry, with 
encouragement to production at all levels' (p. 27). 
-14-
IDS/DP 276 
The next section provides some information on the employment and 
income distribution patterns that accompanied past rapid growth in 
manufacturing. 
b) Employment Creation 
In 1972 an I.L.O. team produced an important report which ex-
tensively discussed a wide range of issues all relevant to Kenya's 
pressing unemployment problem. According to this report, during 
1964 - 70 output growth in the enumerated sector was about 8 per cent 
per annum, with an increase in employment of under 4 per cent per 
annum. There were about 645,000 wage and salaried employees in the 
modern sector in 1970 out of a total population of about 11 million 
in that year. This indicates a small fraction of the working age po-
pulation (about 5.5 million in 1970[ could be absorbed in the modern 
sector. 
From 1972 to 1977, modern sector wage employment rose at an 
average of 4.7 per cent per annum bringing the total to 902,000 in 1977 
(Economic Survey, 1977 and 1978). However, due to unfavourable ex-
ternal events (the oil crisis and the slow down in world economic 
growth) output growth during the same period was disappointingly 
low, averaging 5.5 per cent in the monetary sector. 
Thus, despite low output growth, employment growth remained 
surprisingly high, approximating the growth rate of GDP. The public 
sector accounted for nearly half of the increase in employment. Spe-
cifically the increase in the teacher corps which added about 20 per 
cent to the total increase in the public sector employment. 
In the 1972-77 period the manufacturing sector expanded at an a-
Verage rate of 10 per cent per year (1972, constant prices) despite a 
significant slow down in 1975 following the oil crisis. The 1977 coffee 
boom accelerated domestic demand considerably so that the overall 
growth pattern turned out to be somewhat higher than the target set in 
the 1974-78 Development Plan. Employment in manufacturing rose from 
84,800 in 1972 to 117,900 in 1977 which represents an average growth 
rate of 6.9 per cent (Statistical Abstract 1976). Although this is 
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a high figure, it should be remembered that wage employment in manu-
facturing accounts for only a small share of total modern sector 
employment (11.7 per cent in 1972 an! 13 per cent in 1977) and that 
this sector still absorbs only a tiny part of Kenya's total labour 
force (less than 2 per cent). This is not to say thai employment 
trends in this sector are unimp ~tant, it only emphasises the over-
whelming influence of the rural economy on the overall socio-economic 
performance. 
Economists have noted that manufacturing employment fails to 
grow at approximately the same rate as industrial output. Usually 
this is explained by the existence of 'capital intensive production 
techniques' in the industrial sector, induced by artificial cheap 
capital (through capital investment allowance, accelarated deprecia-
tion allowances and refund of customs duty on capital goods imports)^ 
resulting in high capital-labour ratios. The main question here is, 
whether the demand for labour will show an increase once distortions 
in the relative factor prices have been corrected for. This in turn 
depends on the flexibility of choice in production techniques deter-
mining the scope for substitution between capital and labour in the 
production process. Thus the exent to which the capital-labour ratio 
can be altered, depends crucially on the value of the elasticity 
of substitution between the two production factors. Zero elasticity 
means no substitution is possible. 
Studies of the Kenyan economy suggest an elasticity greater than 
zero (Harris and Todaro, 1969, J.K. Maitha, 1973, L.P. Mureithi, 1975). 
In most cases, in order to estimate substitution elasticity, a model 
including a production function of the CES (constant elasticity of 
substitution) type was employed. 
However, it seems that results of econometric analysis should 
be handled with great caution. The type of available statistical 
data does not always coincide with the smooth presentation of varia-
bles in models. Aggregated data obscure production realities at the 
firm level, while underlying assumptions of the production function 
(for example homogeneous input factors) may lead to erroneous conclu-
sions (5). 
(5) See D. Morawetz, 1974. "Attempts to estimate substitution elasti-
cities econometrically have yielded unsatisfactory results. Even slight 
variations in the period or concepts tend to produce drastically diffe-
rent estimates of elasticity" (p. 516). 
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Despite these problems Maitha (1973), after analysing Kenya's 
industrial development from 1963 to 66, concludes that "results in-
dicate a significant relationship between factor prices in Kenyan 
industries with elasticities of substitution equal to or greater than 
unity. Slow growth of labour absorption can be attributed to capi-
tal labour substitut^n stemming from existing unbalances in the 
relative prices of capital and labour" (p. 49/50). Implicit in this 
reasoning is the assumption that there it a causal relationship be-
tween relative factor prices, the choice of techniques and the de-
mand for labour. In an economy like that of Kenya however, where 
much of" the technology is imported from developed countries,relative 
factor prices may play only a minor role in determining the tech-
nology used. 
Apart from this, the widespread belief that there is a great 
gap between output growth and induced employment growth has been 
challenged by some writers. Weeks (1979) in his study of Kenya's large 
sc.aie manufacturing sector, found that this gap is drastically reduced 
when (instead of output in current prices) the relevant time series 
deflated on real output is used. In that case a 1.4 per cent increase 
in output was associated with a l.O^increase in employment, indi-
cating that the demand for labour in large scale manufacturing is 
much more out-put responsive than previously thought. 
Pack (1972) comes to similar conclusions. He conducted a series 
of interviews with Kenyan manufacturing firms and showed that by 
international standards, Kenyan firms are relatively labour inten-
sive, and that increases in labour productivity were linked more 
to the use of excess capacity and improved organisation and training 
of labour than to increased capital labour ratio's (capital intensi-
ty). 
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Thus the assertion that employment growth lags far behind out-
put growth and the belief that this is caused by high capital inten-
sities appears to lack support when actual developments are taken 
into account. The figures for the 1972-1977 period (10 per cent real 
output growth per annum versus 7.0 per cent employment growth per 
annum) tend to support this conclusion. Employment growth seems to 
be far more output responsive than is usually thought. 
c) Income Distribution 
Although the manufacturing sector has absorbed more labour in 
the 1970's than is generally thought, (6) it is also true that this sec-
tor has not made a significant contribution towards alleviating the 
severe problems of unemployment and unequal income distribution. 
It may be argued that manufacturing, or the industrial sector, 
because of its relative small size in the economy can never be ex-
pected to carry out a "structural transformation" (especially in the 
light of the high rate of population growth of 3.9% in the Kenyan 
case). Nevertheless it is relevant to ask what import-substitution 
and the resulting growth of manufactured output has done to the pattern 
of income distribution. 
We may recall that the protection of domestic manufacturing (aimed 
at speeding up the expansion of industry) has had the effect of rai-
sing manufacturing prices and profits to the detriment of domestic 
consumers. While a small part of the additional income, generated in 
industry goes to hired labour, more goes to management and capital 
owners and another part goes to the government in the form of taxes. 
To put it simply, much of the gains realized in the manufacturing 
sector, as a result of the distorted price structure (inherent in an 
import-substituting policy) can be interpreted into losses for other 
sectors of the economy, in particular agriculture. 
(6) ATso indirectly created jobs in other sectors of the economy: agri-
culture and forestry, transport, storage and communications, trade and 
other services and electricity and water. 
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Thus, import substitution policy has probably enhanced inequa-
lities of income between agriculture and industry. The relative loss, 
suffered by farmers, can be measured by the evolution of the terms 
of trade between these two sectors. Available data suggest that in 
most years in the 1969 - 76 period, prices for farm products have 
risen more slowly than those of manufactured goods. This implies that 
farmers have subsidized industry during most of this period (Kaplinsky, 
1978, p. 6 and Table 2). There was also a substantial net capital 
outflow from agriculture to industry which rose from K£ 50 million 
in 1964 to K£ 124 million in 1974. During the 1964-/4 period over 
K£ 680 million was transferred out of agriculture (Sharpley, 1979, 
p. 560). The relevant question to raise is how these funds were used 
in the other sectors, particularly industry. Again here we touch 
upon the issue of industry's ability to create additional employment 
and to develop linkages with other sectors cf the economy by using 
local resources. According to Sharpley the inflow of intermediate 
inputs (fertilizers, chemicals and seeds) and investment goods (farm 
equipment) was found to be extremely small (Sharpley, 1979, p. 569). 
Moreover if a substantial part of funds transferred to industry is 
used to finance new capital-intensive (foreign) firms and if consi-
derable profits and dividends are transferred abroad, then the situa-
tion becomes highly suspicious. The large net capital outflow from 
agriculture has contributed to a widening of urban-rural imbalances 
and enhanced migration into urban areas. In addition to favouring 
the manufacturing sector, import substitution has probably also fa-
voured profits over wages within that sector. Statistical data show 
that during the 1966-70 period, average real wages rose gradually 
until 1973, but dropped sharply between 1973 to 1976. The 1978 
Economic Survey estimated that average real wages decreased by 
11 per cent during that period and also suggested that 'wage ear-
ners in the lower income group have suffered a larger fall in their 
real wages than those in the middle and upper income groups' (p. 62) 
Profits, on the other hand, seem to have increased during this pe-
riod, indicating a shift from wages to capital income. (Kaplinsky: 
1978, Table 5, p. 11). 
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However these data should be interpreted with caution because 
many statistical and methodological problems are involved in asses- -
sing the pattern of income distribution. There are also levelling 
factors which should be mentioned. These include redistribution 
effects through remittances of migrant labour back to the country-
side; redistribution within the extended family system and the pro-
vision of free or subsidized so:ial services such as education and 
health by the government. 
Past attempts to estimate overall income distribution in Kenya 
(I.L.O. 1972; Morrisson 1973 and Jones 1974) have yielded values of 
the gini coefficient (7) which is widely used as a measure of income 
inequality, in the region of 0.60. It is evident from these studies 
that Kenya's income distribution shows an extreme degree of inequa-
lity. Morrisson (1973) found that, in 1969, the poorest 50 per cent 
of the population received some 14 per cent of total income while 
56 per cent accrued to the richest 10 per cent (8). A recent study 
on income distribution (Crawford and Thorbecke, 1978) found a gini 
coefficient between 0.50 and 0.55. It would be wrong to conclude from 
these figures, that income distribution in Kenya has improved, be-
cause differences in methods, such as different groupings of house-
holds, and different samples, make comparisons suspect. It seems 
unlikely that an import substitution policy which inherently favours 
the urban industrial sector leads to a less unequal distribution of 
income (9). 
As to the geographical location of manufacturing, it seems that 
very little progress has been made in the dispersion of manufacturing 
activities. In 1967 Nairobi and the Coast Province (Mombasa) accounted 
for a disproportionate share of total value added in manufacturing of 
over 78 per cent. By 1976 this share had hardly changed, dropping 
p
r
)H
?
or~¥^iscus?Torr of methods to calculate this coefficient see 0. 
Aseto, 1977. 
(8) Figures taken from Killick, 1976, p. 12. 
(9) According to Hazlewood (1978) too much emphasis is placed upon ine-
quality. A more relevant question would be how absolute levels of income 
of the poor have changed overtime. He also criticizes international 
income comparisons and the I.L.O. 1972 income analysis, (p. 86 f.f.) 
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slightly to 74 per cent (Bigsten, 1977, p. 39). 
After 1975, a policy of selective investment credit allowance 
was introduced, aimed at stimulating dispersion. However, Norcliffe 
(1977) argued that 'by and large the policy seems to have drifted with 
individual locational decisions being made on an ad hoc basis'. (p. 10) 
d) Foreign Investment and Multi-national Firms. 
Industrialization through import substitution means, local pro-
duction of formerly imported goods, partly transnational, branded 
and standardised products. It is no wonder then, that foreign invest-
ment and multinational firms are heavily engaged in Kenya's indus-
trial development. Since independence the Kenya Government has fol-
lowed a generous open-door policy to foreign firms, providing very 
favourable terms. From 1966 onwards international capital poured into 
Kenya. Although fluctuating from year to year, it nevertheless repre-
sents a significant proportion of total investment- in some years as 
much as 20% of the capital formation by enterprises and non-profit 
institutions. 
International capital has become dominant particularly in lar-
ge-scale manufacturing. According to the 1967 Census of Industrial 
Production, predominantly or totally foreign-owned firms contri-
buted 71 per cent of total value-added in Kenya's manufacturing 
sector. Langdon (1978), who surveyed 81 subsidiaries in 1972/73, 
valued the book value of direct foreign investment in Kenya at 
K£ 130 million in 1971/72, representing about 21 per cent of GNP. 
Langdon also confirmed the I.L.O. 1972 report finding that foreign 
capital was involved in about 60 per cent of manufacturing invest-
ment, (I.L.O, 1972, p. 442). 
A recent study undertaken by Kanplinsky on the ownership of all 
large-scale manufacturing (and all tourist firms) (10) shows that 
between 1966 and 1976 foreign investment has remained important. How-
ever, some significant changes have occured during this period. The 
share of total issued capital, owned by foreign firms, declined from 
59.3% in 1966 to 42% in 1976. This is a reflection of a selling-off 
of a minority stake of shareholdings to local firms, the growth of 
n o l R . Kaplinsky, forthcoming. This research 'is"a follow-up study 
of the National Christian Council of Kenya: "Who controls Industry 
in
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small iridigenously-owned enterprises and the increasing role of 
parastatals in joint ventures with foreign capital (Kaplinsky, 19.81, 
p. 443). Furthermore there has been a shift of foreign investment, 
formerly concentrated in the food, beverages, chemicals and rubber 
sectors to the textile, leather, paper and printing sectors. 
However, according to Kaplinsky, these developments have not 
really challenged the control that multinational corporations (mnc's) 
have over a substantial part of Kenya's manufacturing sector (11). 
In Kenya, mnc's are involved in a wide range of products, such 
as food processing, beverages and tobacco, petroleum refining and 
basic industrial chemicals, soap, paint, pharmaceuticals and other 
chemical products, leather and rubber products; cement and metal 
products (Langdon; 1978, p. 142[. 
Evidently the bulk of mnc's manufacturing activities is oriented 
towards consumer goods for the local market,, rather than production 
for export markets. 
Generally speaking, mnc's try to maximize accumulation of capi-
tal and profits at a global level. Their operations may diverge from " 
the needs of national society and may also contradict national govern-
ment policy goals. One of the implications of a large proportion of fo-
reign investment in total Kenyan investment is the high potential of 
a large outflow of profits and dividends. 
Unctad estimates show that in Kenya during 1964-70 inflow of 
new private long term capital almost equaled net outflow of invest-
ment income (Unctad, 1970^. 
(11) The question whether or not local capital has succeeded in play-
ing a successful role in 'the transition to industrial capitalism' 
has led to an animated discussion in the volumes of the "Review of 
African Political Economy", nos. 17,18 and 19; 1980. 
- 2 2 -
IDS/DP 276 
As Stewart (1976, p. 87) points out, this situation illustra-
tes : 
one of the dilemmas facing an economy pursuing a strategy 
of encouraging foreign investment from abroad. Once foreign 
assets form a sizeable proportion of the total stock, the po-
tential dividend outflow also forms a sizeable proportion. 
Hence a high rate of growth of foreign investment must be 
maintained to offset the potential outflow. The maintenance 
of such a rate of growth leads to further potential dividend 
outflow and hence the need further to encourage foreign in-
flow . 
The merits (and demerits) of foreign investment can be asses-
sed in terms of the impact on several key economic factors: choice 
of production techniques, type of products, use and creation of em-
ployment, reinvestment of surplusses and profits, use of imported in-
puts and forward- and backward linkages within the host economy. 
In Kenya relatively little research has been done on these issues. 
The available findings however, tend to suggest that the ultimate 
impact on the overall Kenyan economy is unfavourable. 
Kaplinsky (1978, p. 11) notes that the power of the mnc arises 
largely from their control over technology. A survey of several Bri-
tish mnc's in Kenya revealed that "parent corporations are anxious 
to control the generation of a new technology in their subsidiaries 
and that, particularly in the consumer and intermediate goods sec-
tors, the subsidiairies are largely dependent upon parent companies 
for the generation (and choice) of new technology" (p. 11). However 
this does not necessarily mean that mnc's are using capital inten-
sive techniques. Where comparison is made between local and foreign 
owned firms, the latter appear to use marginally more labour intensive 
techniques (Kaplinsky, 1978, p. 13). 
It appears that mnc's are not much effected by market price com-
petition due to the high levels of protection. In fact one of the 
main reasons making foreign firms eager to invest in developing coun-
tries including Kenya, is that they can exploit the existing imperfec-
tions in tne factor and product market giving them a monopolistic 
advantage. This allows for high levels of surplus appropriation, in-
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eluding high profits while operating below maximum capacity utiliza-
tion. Hopcraft, among others, has set out the negative results of a 
heavily protected economy. Import bans or controls lead to distor-
tions in the price structure, by increasing the domestic price of 
non-essential products (formerly imported). "The problem comes not 
with luxury items per se, but with irrational distortions that bias 
incentives toward inward-looking luxury goods production. The bias 
is simultaneously toward import-intensive, capital-intensive lines, 
and away from internationally efficient, exportable lines". (Hopcraft, 
1972, p.6). Mnc's also tend to add little value-added while producing 
in Kenya. Both Langdon and Kaplinsky found evidence that mnc subsi-
diaries, operating in Kenya, mainly assemble, mix and package impor-
ted inputs. Thus most value-added has already been realized abroad in 
parent firms. 
Backward linkages are few since 98% of import-substituting 
firms imported over 70% of their machinery and nearly 70% of these 
firms imported 70% of their raw materials (Langdon, 1975). 
Large mnc's also successfully gain protection privileges in 
bargaining with government institutions. According to Langdon (1978) 
and Hopcraft (forthcoming) a cooperative symbiosis develops between 
mnc's and the dominant African class, sharing the benefits which 
accentuates the inequalities within Kenyan society (Langdon, 1978, 
p. 198). 
Another effect of mnc's operations is the tendency to change 
consumer taste in the host country towards the particular branded 
products which they produce at home. This redefiniton of consumer 
needs (e.g. the translation of thirst into the need for a Coke) 
often accompanied by mass advertising, may threaten small scale 
indigenous entrepreneurs and force them to produce simular branded, 
standardised articles. The majority of these 'informal sector' firms 
will not be able to make such a shift and will be forced out of bu-
siness. Evidence for this is provided by Langdon in his 1973 sur-
vey of 32 African shoe manufacturers in Machakos district, his 
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'soap case study' (Langdon, 1975) and by the 'maize flour study' 
(Stewart, 1979). Eglin (1978) found that local entrepreneurs, most-
ly Kenyan Asians, unable to compete with foreign firms in the im-
port substituting consumer industries, have made "a significant 
number of investments in the production of intermediate and capi-
tal goods" (Eglin, p. 132). 
However Kaplinsky questions the conclusion that indigenous 
entrepreneurs have been forced out of the market by mnc's activi-
ties. He cites Swainson (1976) who found that African-owned shoe 
firms had expanded considerably and had begun to compete with some 
success with the established mnc operating in that sector (Kaplins-
ky, 1978, p. 15). 
Other negative effects of mnc's operations can also be mentio-
ned. The western-type of products of mnc's require the importation 
of 'sophisticated inputs' (which parent companies are only too glad 
to provide) and this 'tends to block off many potential linkages 
to any integrated national economy" (Godfrey and Langdon, 1976, p.50). 
Mnc's, furthermore tend to contribute to 'a polarisation of the 
national labour market' by paying relatively high wages and salaries 
to their labourers and managerial staff. High salary levels abroad, 
in particular for managers and directors, are passed on to Kenyan 
managers and directors in the subsidiaries and "acted through the 
market mechanism on other higher-level salaries in the public and 
private sector" (Godfrey and Langdon, 1976, p. 51). 
Altogether, it seems unlikely that multinational corporations 
are contributing to the process of genuine industrial development 
in Kenya. But as Kaplinsky (1978 p. 20) remarked: 
it is one thing to highlight the negative characteristics of 
this foreign investment, but the question remains whether the 
host state or an indigenous bourgeoisie would have undertaken 
similar or equivalent investments and, if so, whether the im-
pact of their investment would have been substantially dif-
ferent. The nature of the political formation in Kenya with 
a passive state, a fleeing Asian industrial bourgeoisie and 
a slowly emerging African industrial bourgeoisie makes it 
difficult to envisage industrialization without the extensive 
and relatively unrestrained participation of direct foreign 
investment . (Kaplinsky, 1978, p. 20/21). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper was to bring together research findings 
to answer the important question whether or not the type of indus-
trial development in Kenya has contributed to the establishment of 
an integrated economy aimed at raising productivity and higher stan-
dards of living for the entire population. 
Drawing up the balance-sheet, we find little reason for opti-
mism. We have seen that import substituting industrialization im-
plied a process of uneven growth. Resources have been concentrated 
on a small part of the economy, (admittedly with great success in 
terms of output growth) and have to a large extent, neglected the 
rest. The type of industrialization, that occurred has not led to 
a 'structural transformation' of the Kenyan economy. Growth in the 
manufacturing sector has been growth within existing categories of 
industries. 
Import substitution industrialization did not lessen Kenya's 
external dependence but merely changed its nature. Capital-and in-
termediate goods became much more important items on the import 
list. It is paradoxical that the provision of these goods have be-
come vital for the new industries, and that any constraint on their 
importation (in the case of shortages of foreign exchange to pay for 
them) may cause industrial stagnation. 
Import substitution policies tend to discriminate against agri-
culture. Price and tax policies were designed to transfer a consi-
derable amount of capital out of agriculture to the benefit of the 
industrial sector. Generated income in the latter was to a limited 
extend used to create employment since employers in manufacturing, 
due to relatively cheap capital and other institutional factors, 
favoured foreign technologies. This in turn has contributed to un-
derutilization of production capacity, inducing high costs of pro-
duction , 
Multinational corporations have taken advantage of 'distorted' 
factor markets and the inherited unequal income distribution by pro-
viding western-type consumer goods, thus accentuating the skewed 
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pattern of income distribution. They are also trying to 'redefine' 
consumer needs and tastes, often through mass advertising, thus 
threatening the market share of small indigenous enterpreneurs, who 
may use more appropriate (local resources) technologies. Furthermore 
the considerable outflow of dividends and other payments to foreign 
investors makes it necessary to rely even more on foreign investment 
in order to achieve further industrial growth, thus making the coun-
try even more dependent on external forces. It seems clear that Ke-
nya needs to switch to a more redist.ributive development strategy, 
perhaps along the lines of the I.L.O. 1972 report. 
Indeed, the last two Development Plans (1974 - 78 and 1979 -
83) show clear indications that the government is planning measures 
in this direction. (12) However a radical change in industrial and 
overall strategies, away from import substitution and inherent fo-
reign involvement, will probably run counter to the interests of 
those (powerful) groups who have benefited most form past strategies. 
pTflTtudying~the government responses to the IL0 (1972) report, how-
ever, is not very encouraging. Killick (1976) characterizes govern-
>ment reaction to the IL0 proposals 'as one of dilution
1
, (p. 30) 
For a similar conclusion see C. Leys (1979). 
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